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Abstract. SREC markets are a market-based system designed to incentivize solar energy generation. A
regulatory body imposes a lower bound on the amount of energy each regulated firm must generate
via solar means, providing them with a certificate for each MWh generated. Regulated firms
seek to navigate the market to minimize the cost imposed on them, by modulating their SREC
generation and trading activities. As such, the SREC market can be viewed through the lens of a
large stochastic game with heterogeneous agents, where agents interact through the market price
of the certificates. We study this stochastic game by solving the mean-field game (MFG) limit with
sub-populations of heterogeneous agents. Our market participants optimize costs accounting for
trading frictions, cost of generation, SREC penalty, and generation uncertainty. Using techniques
from variational analysis, we characterize firms’ optimal controls as the solution of a new class of
McKean-Vlasov FBSDE and determine the equilibrium SREC price. We further prove that MFG
strategy has the -Nash property for the finite player game. Finally, we numerically solve the
MV-FBSDEs and conclude by demonstrating how firms behave in equilibrium using simulated
examples.
Key words. Commodity Markets, SREC, Cap and Trade, Mean-Field Games, Variational Analysis, McKean-
Vlasov, Market Design
AMS subject classifications. 37A50, 49J50, 49N70, 34H05, 49N90, 93C95
1. Introduction. Climate change has emerged as the preeminent global issue of the 21st
century, resulting (belatedly) in the increased adoption of policy solutions to promote clean
energy generation, or to disincentivize the production of energy via means that produce
harmful emissions. A carbon tax is the most popular and well known policy solution which
attempts to do the latter.
Among the set of policy implementations aimed at combating climate change are the
class of so called market-based solutions. The most well-known of these policies are carbon
cap and trade (C&T) markets (also colloquially referred to as emissions markets). An
alternative approach is known as ‘renewable energy certificate’ (REC) markets. In these
markets, a regulator imposes a lower bound on the proportion of energy generated from
renewable sources that each regulated load serving entity (LSE) sells to the electrical grid,
over a given time period (called a compliance period). Any generator (who may be a
regulated LSE, but is not necessarily) is granted a certificate for each MWh of energy it
generates from said renewable sources. Each regulated LSE must submit certificates in the
amount of the lower bound prescribed to it by the regulator, while subject to a monetary
penalty for failing to submit the required certificates. This penalty is typically per unit of
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non-compliance. That is, falling m certificates short of the requirement results in a penalty
m times more severe than falling 1 certificate short of the requirement. In practice, these
markets consist of many consecutive, non-overlapping compliance periods.
The certificates that generators are granted are tradable. As such, a regulated LSE
need not necessarily generate their certificates themselves. Instead, they may purchase the
required certificates for compliance on the marketplace. Regulated firms therefore must
make a choice about whether to produce electricity from renewable means themselves, or
purchase the certificates on the market (or a mix of both). Naturally, firms interact with
one another through their behaviours in the REC marketplace and thus each regulated LSE
has an impact on every other regulated LSE.
REC markets may also be targeted to a specific type of renewable energy, in order to
encourage growth of that particular energy type. The most common of the targeted REC
markets are Solar REC (SREC) markets, which have been implemented in many areas in the
northeastern United States and Europe (most notably, Sweden and Norway). We primarily
focus on SREC markets in this work. In particular, we aim to understand how regulated
LSEs1 should behave in SREC markets, with respect to their mix of SREC generation and
trading activity such that they navigate the SREC market at minimum cost. In order
to model this in a complete manner, we must consider the potential interactions between
agents through their marketplace actions, as well as the possibly heterogeneous nature of
the regulated LSEs.
The existing literature on SREC markets focuses heavily on the price formation of cer-
tificates. [25] proposes a stochastic model for economy-wide SREC generation, calibrating
it to the New Jersey SREC market, and ultimately solves for the equilibrium SREC price.
They further investigate the role of regulatory parameters and discuss potential takeaways
for the efficient design of SREC markets. Other works, such as [3] and [42] discuss the
volatility inherent in REC prices, analyzing the price dynamics of these systems and the
reasons for said volatility. In [43], the authors go one step further, proposing an alternative
SREC market design in order to stabilize SREC prices. [52] flips the typical focus of works in
SREC markets, using an exogenous price process as an input to model optimal behaviour on
the part of a regulated agent in an SREC market, conducting numerical simulation studies
to understand and characterize the nature of the firm’s optimal controls.
There is considerably more literature on carbon C&T markets, which REC markets
resemble. In [51], the authors represent firm behaviour as the solution to an optimal con-
trol problem from the perspective of a central planner overseeing the emissions market in a
single-period C&T market and aiming to optimize total expected societal cost. The authors
then characterize and solve for the carbon allowance price process. This is further extended
to a multi-period C&T market in [35], which leads to the equilibrium carbon allowance
price being expressed as a strip European binary options written on economy-wide emis-
sions. Agents’ optimal strategies and properties of allowance prices are also studied by [15]
and [14] via functional analysis arguments, within a single compliance period setup. Both
works also make significant contributions through detailed quantitative analyses of potential
shortcomings of these markets and their alternatives (in [15]) and of the certificate price and
its properties (in [14]). In each of these four works, the authors argue for the equivalence
1We often refer to the regulated LSEs of an SREC market as regulated agents or firms.
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between the solution to the optimization problem for the central planner and an equilibrium
solution whereby each individual agent optimizes their profit. However, these works do not
incorporate trading frictions into their model. Additionally, they focus on the implications
of the solution to the optimization problem posed on the certificate price, as opposed to the
nature of the optimal behaviour of the regulated agents themselves, which is the primary
focus of this work. There is also notable work on structural models for financial instruments
in emissions markets, such as [36] and [11].
In this work, we aim to understand how a regulated LSE should navigate an SREC
market. As such, we formulate the SREC market as an N -player stochastic game, with
each player representing a regulated LSE who controls their planned SREC generation and
SREC trading behaviour, aiming to navigate the SREC system at minimum cost. SREC
generation is subject to some level of randomness, to represent the inherent variation in
weather that impacts ones ability to generate solar energy. Rather than solving the N -
player stochastic game directly, we turn towards a mean-field game (MFG) approach. This
approach aims to approximate the optimal behaviours of large populations of interacting
agents in a stochastic game, making it a natural fit to apply to SREC markets.
We use methods from variational analysis to establish existence and uniqueness of a solu-
tion to an arbitrary firm’s optimization problem, given a particular mean-field distribution.
We then fully characterize the optimal controls of a regulated agent and the correspond-
ing mean-field distribution through a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE, which we solve numerically.
Finally, we conduct numerical analyses in order to better understand the nature of the
solutions, and their associated implications on certificate prices.
MFGs themselves are very well-studied. They were originally developed in the works
[39, 40], and [45–47]. Many extensions and generalizations of mean-field games and their
applications exist. Among them include the probabilistic approach to MFGs and MFGs with
common noise and master equation, detailed extensively in [12,13], [9] and [7]. Additionally,
the theory of MFGs with a combination of major and minor agents was developed in [6,19,
37,49] (see also [8]). In addition to these seminal works introducing the idea of MFGs and
approaches to solving them, the numerical analysis of MFGs has also been well-studied.
In particular, [4] and [24] study numerical approaches to the solutions of McKean-Vlasov
forward-backward stochastic differential equations (MV-FBSDEs), which often characterize
the solutions to MFGs. [5] proposes a computational methodology to solve a set of forward-
backward PDEs related to a MFG formulation of cellular communication networks.
MFGs have found numerous applications in engineering [5, 26, 44], economics [32, 33],
and in particular mathematical finance including optimal execution problems and portfolio
trading [10, 18, 20, 21, 28–31, 41, 48], systemic risk [16, 17, 54], and commodities markets
[2, 22,34] - just to name a few important contributions.
There are several key differences between our work and the extant literature. To the
author’s knowledge, this is the first work applying MFG theory to SREC or C&T markets
in order to understand the dynamics of the certificate price process as well as the optimal
behaviours of agents regulated by these markets. We believe insights into these features of
these markets are of interest for regulatory bodies and regulated firms alike. As previously
mentioned, this work separates itself from much of the analogous work in the world of
C&T markets through its focus on the optimal behaviours of regulated firms in addition
to the certificate price process; the former is not explicitly a major focus of much of the
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prior work in this field. Similarly, the prior literature in this field does not incorporate
trading frictions into their modelling of the costs firms face, to the author’s knowledge. We
explicitly account for this, reflecting the fact that trading is not inherently costless in these
markets. Finally, the use of the MFG methodology in this work allows us to capture the
interactions between agents which arise through their trading behaviour, and solve each
agent’s individual optimization problem directly, rather than solving a global problem from
the perspective of a central planner aiming to minimize overall economy-wide costs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formalize the
SREC market and present our model for the regulated firms. Section 3 formally poses the
optimization problem that each agent faces in the N -player stochastic game. We introduce
the MFG limit of this problem and derive the form of the optimal controls given a particular
mean-field distribution in Section 4, using techniques from variational analysis. Further,
we are able to characterize the MFG solution as a function of the solution to a McKean-
Vlasov FBSDE. Finally, in Section 6, we perform numerical simulations and discuss the key
takeaways of the structure of the optimal controls across agents, as well as the implications
these controls have on the certificate price and economy-wide compliance probabilities.
2. The Model.
2.1. SREC Market Rules and Assumptions. We assume the following rules for the
SREC market, which are exogenously specified and fixed. In an n-period framework, a firm
must submit (R1, ..., Rn) SRECs at the end of the compliance periods [0, T1], ..., [Tn−1, Tn],
respectively. For every SREC below Ri at Ti that a firm submits, they must pay Pi.
Firms receive SRECs through the generation of electricity through solar means. One
SREC corresponds to one MWh of electricity produced via solar energy. A firm may also
purchase or sell SRECs on the market. Throughout this work, we assume firms may bank
leftover SRECs (that are unused for compliance) indefinitely. This is a simplification of
reality - in most cases, there are limits on how many times an SREC can be banked.
However, this simplification allows us to greatly reduce the dimensionality of our state
space, allowing the problem to be computationally tractable. After Tn, all firms forfeit
any remaining SRECs. Tn can be thought of as ‘the end of the world’ - there are no costs
associated with any time after this. In the New Jersey SREC market, the largest and
most developed in North America, the current penalty for non-compliance is $258, with the
current SREC price slightly below that, at roughly $230 per SREC2 [53].
In this work, we focus heavily on a single-period SREC market framework. In this
setting, the rules above apply with n = 1. Naturally, there is no concept of banking unused
SRECs in a single-period framework. For notational convenience, we remove the subscripts
in the quantities described above when discussing the single-period SREC market. That is,
the regulated firm is required to submit Rk SRECs at time T , representing their required
production for the compliance period [0, T ]. A penalty P is imposed for each missing SREC
at time T . There are assumed to be no costs after time T .
2.2. Model Setup and Motivation. In this subsection, we formulate the SREC market
detailed above as a finite-player stochastic game, where agents are simultaneously striving
to achieve maximum profit while interacting with one another through their SREC trading
2As of February 13, 2020
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activities. We define the SREC price endogenously; that is, the SREC price is a function of
the supply and demand for SRECs across the regulated firms. We allow for agent hetero-
geneity by defining a finite number of sub-populations of agents with unique behavioural
parameters.
We work on the filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈T,P). All processes are assumed to
be F-adapted unless otherwise stated. The filtration is defined further later in this section.
We assume there are a finite number (N) of firms and index them by i ∈ N := {1, ..., N}.
We further specify that each firm belongs to a sub-population (or class) and index the classes
by k ∈ K := {1, ...,K}, with K ≤ N . All agents within a sub-population are assumed to be
homogeneous and interchangeable, but are heterogeneous across classes. We also define
(2.1) Kk := {i ∈ N| agent i belongs to sub-population k},
and Nk := |Kk| to be the number of firms in class k for all k ∈ K, with
∑
k∈KNk = N .
Assumption 1. The proportion of the total population of agents belonging to each class
k converges to a constant as the number of firms (N) increases. That is,
(2.2) lim
N→∞
Nk
N = pik ∈ (0, 1) a.s., ∀k ∈ K
Agent i (belonging to arbitrary sub-population k) can control their planned generation
rate (SRECs/year) (git)t∈T (where T := [0, T ]) at any given time and their trading rate
(SRECs/year) (Γit)t∈T at any given time. The processes gi and Γi constitute the control
actions of firm i. Trading rates may be positive or negative, reflecting that firms can either
buy or sell SRECs at the prevailing market rate for SRECs, respectively. Generation is
assumed to be non-negative. We denote the collection of generate rates and trading rates
by gt := (g
1
t , · · · , , gNt ) and Γt := (Γ1t , · · · ,ΓNt ), respectively.
In an arbitrary time period [t1, t2], the firm aims to generate G
i
t1,t2 :=
∫ t2
t1
git dt, but
in fact generates G
i,(r)
t1,t2
:=
∫ t2
t1
gitdt +
∫ t2
t1
σkt dW
i
t , where σ
k
t is a deterministic function of
time. The diffusive term σkt dW
i
t may be interpreted as the generation rate uncertainty
at t due to, e.g., stochasticity in the intensity of sunlight. We assume that a firm has a
deterministic baseline generation level hkt (SRECs/year) and generating at a rate different
from the baseline incurs a penalty. For example, a firm may choose to rent solar panels from
another generator in order to increase their SREC generation, which would carry some cost.
Methods similar to [25] may be used to estimate hkt and σ
k
t . We assume that 0 ≤ hkt < ∞
for all t.
The firms controlled SREC inventory (with controls git,Γ
i
t) is denoted by X
i = (Xit)t∈T,
and satisfies the SDE
(2.3) dXit = (g
i
t + Γ
i
t)dt+ σ
k
t dW
i
t , ∀i ∈ Kk3
where W = {W i = (W it )t∈T, i ∈ N} is a set of N independent standard Brownian motions,
and W i is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration FW := (FWt )t∈T ⊂ F
generated by W . Each firm has an initial inventory of SRECs, given by the collection of
3This implies that SRECs are fractional and infinitely divisible in our model.
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random variables {ξi}Ni=1. The empirical distribution µ(N)t of X = {Xi = (Xit)t∈T, i ∈ N}
is defined as
(2.4) µ
[N ]
t (dx) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXit (dx),
where δx denotes the Dirac measure (unit point mass at x).
Assumption 2. The initial states {ξi}Ni=1 defined on (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈T,P) are identically dis-
tributed, mutually independent and also independent of FW . Moreover, supi E[‖ξi‖2] ≤ c <
∞, 0 ≤ i ≤ N < ∞, with c independent of N . For notational ease, we say that ξi ∼ µ(k)0 ,
for all i ∈ Kk, for all k ∈ K.
We denote the equilibrium SREC price process by Sg,Γ = (Sg,Γt )t∈T. With this notation,
we emphasize the dependence of the SREC price on the actions of all agents; indeed, the
SREC market (and accordingly, the equilibrium SREC price) is the mechanism by which
agents interact with one another. We do not make any explicit assumptions about the
dynamics of Sg,Γt . Instead, we derive its form endogenously in Section 4.3, through the
assumption that trading must be zero-sum among all agents. This results in a market
clearing condition that allows us to endogenously derive an analytic formula for SREC
price based on the states and behaviours of all regulated agents.
We now introduce the filtration Gi = (Git)t∈T that an individual adapts their strategy
to.
(2.5) Git := σ
(
(Xiu)u∈[0,t]
) ∨ σ((Sg,Γt )
u∈[0,t]
)
is the sigma algebra generated by the i-th firm’s SREC inventory and the SREC price
path. Note we assume that all firms have knowledge of the the initial distribution (but not
the actual value) of firms’ SRECs; that is, firm’s have knowledge of µ
(k)
0 . Moreover, we
define the filtration G := ∨i∈N σ
(
(Xiu)u∈[0,t]
) ∨ σ((Sg,Γt )
u∈[0,t]
)
generated by the SREC
inventories of all firms and the SREC price. For all i ∈ N, we have that Gi ⊂ F .
We define the set of (individual agent) square integrable controls
(2.6) H2t :=
{
(g,Γ) : Ω× T→ R2, E
[∫ T
0
(gt)
2 dt
]
<∞, E
[∫ T
0
(Γt)
2 dt
]
<∞
}
.
Assumption 3. The set of admissible controls for firm i ∈ N is
Ai := {(g,Γ) ∈ H2t s.t. gt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T and g,Γ are Gi-adapted } .(2.7)
This is a closed and convex set. As an individual firm cannot observe another firms SREC
inventory, the restriction in the set above is to decentralized Gi-adapted strategies.
We also define a set of admissible controls, for which firms have the information of all
firms, and their centralized strategies are G-adapted, as in
A(N) := {(g,Γ) ∈ H2t s.t. gt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T and g,Γ are G-adapted } .(2.8)
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3. Constructing the Agents Optimization Problem. Each agent chooses their controls
with the goal of minimizing the cost (equivalently, maximizing the profit) they incur through
the SREC market over the time span [0, T ]. For each i ∈ N, let A−i :=Śj∈N,j 6=iAj . We
also denote AN :=Śj∈NAj .
Specifically, the i-th firm (belonging to sub-population k) aims to minimize the cost
functional J i : A → R where
(3.1) J i(g,Γ) = E
[∫ T
0
(
Ck(giu, h
k
u) +H
k(Γiu) + S
g,Γ
u Γ
i
u
)
du+ P (Rk −XiT )+
]
.
The agent’s objective comprises of four distinct terms. The first corresponds to costs
associated with planned SREC generation. Specifically, the agent incurs the cost Ck(g, h)
per unit time for its level of planned SREC generation. We choose
Ck(g, h) := 12ζ
k(g − h)2.
[2] studies a related problem in the context of expanding solar capacity where costs are
quadratic. This is both differentiable and convex, both of which are desirable properties for
our analysis. Our cost can be interpreted as stemming from a firm renting solar capacity to
increase their planned SREC generation rate. For example, a firm with a constant baseline
generation rate of 0 that chooses to generate 5 SRECs / year constantly throughout a
compliance period incurs a cost of T2 ζ
k52 over the course of the compliance period.
In practice, when firms choose to expand their solar energy generation, they often do
so by undertaking projects to build or acquire solar energy generation facilities, which they
then operate. This increases their ability to generate solar energy (and thus SRECs) on an
ongoing basis. In our model, a firms planned generation choice does not have a long-term
impact on their baseline generation rate, as that extension is left for future work.
The second term corresponds to a trading speed penalty. The firm incurs a trading
penalty of Hk(Γ), per unit time. This induces a constraint on their trading speed. Specifi-
cally, we choose
Hk(Γ) = 12γ
k(Γ)2, γk > 0.
This cost introduces a key difference between our model and the extant literature in the
C&T work. As mentioned in Section 1, prior work in this field does not incorporate trading
costs of this form into their cost functional for agents (see [35], [51], [14], [15]).
The third term corresponds to the cost (revenue) generated when purchasing (selling)
an SREC on the market, with the firm paying (receiving) the equilibrium SREC price Sg,Γt .
The fourth and final term corresponds to the non-compliance penalty the firm faces if
they fail to submit the required number of SRECs at the end of the compliance period.
We allow the requirement to vary based on sub-population. In doing so, we can also
incorporate the participants in SREC markets who do not have an RPS obligation at all,
but do possess the means to generate SRECs, which they may sell on the market. We
observe that the non-compliance penalty is not differentiable at XiT = R
k. This poses a
problem for our analysis. To avoid issues with differentiability, we introduce a ‘regularized’
version of the non-compliance penalty. We require this regularized version of the non-
compliance penalty to be convex and everywhere once differentiable. Requiring the former
maintains the convexity of the optimization problem, and requiring the latter ensures our
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functional is Gaˆteaux differentiable everywhere. There are many suitable regularizations;
one such example is
(3.2) Fδ(x) =

0, x < −δ,
(x+δ)2
4δ , |x| ≤ δ,
x, x > δ,
where δ > 0. It is obvious that Fδ(R
k − XiT ) and (Rk − XiT )+ agree everywhere except
|x| < δ. As δ → 0, the length of the domain on which Fδ(Rk−XiT ) disagrees with (Rk−XiT )+
tends to 0. The selection of Fδ(x) made in (3.2) is obviously convex and everywhere twice
differentiable.
With the specific form of the various cost, the performance criterion (3.1) becomes
(3.3) J i(g,Γ) = E
[∫ T
0
(
ζk
2 (g
i
u − hku)2 + γ
k
2 (Γ
i
u)
2 + Sg,Γu Γ
i
u
)
du+ P Fδ(R
k −XiT )
]
for agents i ∈ Kk.
To summarize the key notation introduced in the current and previous section for the
readers benefit, we present Table 1 below.
Quantity Description Units
git Planned generation rate for i-th agent SRECs / year
Γit Trading rate for i-th agent SRECs / year
ζk Generation cost parameter for class k firms $ / SRECs2
γk Trading speed penalty parameter for class k firms $ / SRECs2
σkt Volatility function for class k firms SRECs /
√
year
hkt Baseline generation rate for class k firms SRECs / year
Sg,Γt SREC market price at time t $ / SREC
Xit SREC inventory of i-th agent at time t SRECs
T Terminal time of period Years
P Penalty per unit of non-compliance $ / lacking SREC
Rk SREC Requirement for class k firms SRECs
Table 1: Notation.
Agents within a sub-population have the same cost parameters, and consequently, those
agents act, in equilibrium, in a similar manner. Each individual agent’s strategy, however,
is adapted to their own inventory and as such, agents’ strategies are not identical, even
within the same sub-population.
As previously stated, all agents seek to minimize their own costs, and we look for the
optimal control for all agents simultaneously. That is, we seek a collection of controls
{(gi,?,Γi,?) ∈ Ai : i ∈ N} such that:
(3.4) (gi,?,Γi,?) = arg inf
(gi,Γi)∈Ai
J i(g,Γ), ∀i ∈ Kk, ∀k ∈ K.
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Additionally, we seek Sg,Γ such that
(3.5)
∑
i∈N Γ
i,?
t
N
=
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Kk Γ
i,?
t
N
= 0,
t − a.e, t ∈ T, P a.s. In the finite-player setting, this condition states that trading is zero-
sum among regulated agents in the SREC market, and is also known as the market clearing
condition. The imposition of this condition allows us to define the equilibrium price Sg,Γt
endogenously through the optimal controls.
As the cost functional for each agent is impacted by the actions of all other agents
through the price process, solving (3.4) for the finite player game is challenging. As such,
in the next section, following the mean-field game methodology, we treat the problem in its
infinite population limit (as N →∞) to make the problem tractable. The goal is to obtain
a strategy which is exact in the infinite population limit, that we can then apply to the
finite population case, assuming the finite population is sufficiently large.
4. The Mean-Field Game Limit.
4.1. Formulation of the Mean Field Game. The stochastic game specified in the prior
sections is difficult to solve directly. Instead, we focus our efforts on solving the stochastic
game in the limit as N → ∞4 following the mean-field game (MFG) methodology. In
the infinite-population limit, the finite player game becomes a MFG where agents interact
through the population distribution of states, rather than directly. This makes the MFG
simpler to solve than the finite player game, and the formulation of the MFG is the focus of
this subsection. Proceeding this, we derive the optimal controls and the equilibrium SREC
price.
To begin, we present the infinite-population limit of the problem mathematically, by
taking N → ∞. Prior to defining the firm’s cost functional in this setting, we make an
additional definition.
Definition 4.1 (Mean Field Distribution of States). In the infinite-player setting, we
denote the mean-field distribution of SREC inventory for agents in sub-population k by
µ
(k)
t . Specifically, we introduce the flow of measures
(4.1) µ(k) = (µ
(k)
t )t∈T, µ
(k)
t ∈ P(R),∀t ∈ T
for all k ∈ K, where P(R) represents the space of all probability measures on R, such that
µ
(k)
t (A) is the probability that a representative agent from sub-population k has an SREC
inventory belonging to the set A ∈ B(R), at time t.
Furthermore, we define
(4.2) µ = {(µ(k)t )t∈T}k∈K
to be the collection of all mean-field flow of measures.
4We assume the proportion of agents in each sub-population remains constant, and that all agents are
minor agents (that is, in the limit, each agent is insignificant relative to the rest of the market).
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The mean-field distribution of states µ
(k)
t is a probability measure representing the
distribution of SREC inventory for an agent chosen at random from sub-population k.
In (3.3), only the equilibrium SREC price is dependent on the actions of other agents in
the game. In the infinite population limit, we replace Sg,Γt with a process S
µ
t which, in line
with the mean-field limit, we assume is not impacted by any individual agent’s behaviour,
but is impacted by the mean-field distribution5.
In the mean field setting, we define the clearing condition as the infinite-population
limit of (3.5)
(4.3) lim
N→∞
∑
i∈N
Γit
N
= 0,
t − a.e., P − a.s., for all t ∈ T. This is analagous to the average trading rate at all times
being 0 in the limit.
A class of mean-field games are characterized by the dependence of an individual agent’s
cost functional on the mean-field distribution of states. In our problem, this dependence
only arises implicitly through Sµt . We postpone the characterization of this dependence
until Section 4.3, after we have defined the problem in the mean-field setting, and obtained
the functional form of the optimal controls. We do this as Sµt is ultimately derived from
the market clearing condition of (optimal) trading being zero-sum across all agents. Until
such time, it suffices to consider Sµt as a generic stochastic process that is measurable with
respect to each firm’s filtration, that ultimately depends on the mean-field distribution
defined in Definition 4.1. We also note here that Sµt must be bounded above by P , as a
firm would not pay above P to obtain an SREC to avoid a penalty worth P .
Consequently, firm-i’s cost functional, i ∈ Kk, is now (in matrix form) denoted by J i
and equals
J i(gi,Γi;µ) = E
[ ∫ T
0
{(
giu Γ
i
u
)
Qk
(
giu
Γiu
)
+
(
giu Γ
i
u
)(−ζkhku
Sµu
)
+ ζ
k
2 (h
k
u)
2
}
du
+ P Fδ(R
k −Xit)
]
,(4.4)
where Qk = 12
(
ζk 0
0 γk
)
is positive definite.
Similar to the finite player game, we aim to find the set of strategies that form a Nash
equilibrium. That is, we search for a collection of controls {(gi,?,Γi,?) ∈ Ai}∞i=1 such that
(4.5) (gi,?,Γi,?) = arg inf
(g,Γ)∈Ai
J i(g,Γ;µ), ∀i ∈ N
To solve (4.5) and obtain the optimal controls, we use techniques from variational analysis.
As with the finite-player case, we also seek Sµt such that the clearing condition (4.3) holds.
In the following subsection, we detail the approach that we take in solving (4.5). Note that
the notation implies µ is an input to the problem. Additionally, it is also an output, as
the optimal controls will determine the distribution of the states through (2.3). We must
5We show in Section 4.3 that the equilibrium SREC price indeed has this dependence
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ensure we obtain consistency between the input and output specifications of µ. As such,
this problem as has fixed point element to it, which will be discussed in further detail in
this section.
4.2. Deriving the optimal controls. Our approach to deriving the optimal controls is
as follows. We initially consider the problem of finding the optimal controls for a particular
mean field distribution. That is, we treat some arbitrary µ as an input to the problem. We
establish that the cost functional (4.4) is strictly convex and differentiable (in the sense that
its Gaˆteaux derivative exists everywhere in all directions). From here, we find the value of
the controls for which the Gaˆteaux derivative vanishes, in terms of some stochastic process
Y it , as well as µ. The convexity of the functional guarantees such controls are optimal, and
moreover, they correspond to a unique global optimum, given the mean-field µ.
Subsequently, we use the form of the optimal controls to present a system of MV-
FBSDEs, where we seek a set of mean-field distributions µ such that the forward processes
of the solution to the system of FBSDEs we propose has marginal distributions consistent
with said mean-field distributions. This approach, summarized in Figure 1, results in a
fixed point problem. We further discuss this element of the problem in Subsection 4.4.
Take µ
as
input
Obtain
gi,?t ,Γ
i,?
t
(in terms
of Y it & µ)
Find Sµt
(in terms
of Y it & µ)
Formulate
FBSDE and
solve for
Xit , Y
i
t ,L(Xit)
for all k ∈ K
Variational
Analysis
Clearing
condition
Check µ
(k)
t ,L(Xit) for consistency, for all k ∈ K
Figure 1: Structure of solving for optimal actions and clearing prices in the mean-field game
limit.
Proposition 4.2 (Convexity of Cost Functional). The functional J i in (4.4) is strictly
convex in Ai, given a mean-field distribution µ.
Proof. We must show that J i has the following property: for λ ∈ (0, 1) and two sets of
controls (gi,Γi), (wi, υi) ∈ Ai, we require that
(4.6) J i(λgi + (1− λ)wi, λΓi + (1− λ)υi;µ) < λJ i(gi,Γi;µ) + (1− λ)J i(wi, υi;µ).
To do so, first write J i(gi,Γi;µ) = Gi(gi,Γi;µ) +H i(gi,Γi;µ), where
Gi(gi,Γi;µ) := E
[∫ T
0
(
git Γ
i
t
)
Qk
(
git
Γit
)
+
(
git Γ
i
t
)(−ζkhkt
Sµt
)
+ ζ
k
2 (h
k
t )
2dt
]
,(4.7)
H i(gi,Γi;µ) := E
[
PFδ(R
k −Xi0 −
∫ T
0
(
git Γ
i
t
)(1
1
)
− σkW iT )
]
.(4.8)
We prove that Gi is strictly convex and H i is convex, which implies that J i is strictly
convex.
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Let us first consider Gi. As Qk is positive definite, the first term is strictly convex in
the controls. The second term is linear in the controls, and thus is also convex (though not
strictly convex). The third term is independent of the controls. Through the linearity of
integrals, and since the sum of a strictly convex and a convex function is strictly convex, it
is clear that Gi a strictly convex functional of the controls.
It remains to show that H i(gi,Γi;µ) is a convex functional of the controls.
H i(λgi+(1− λ)wi, λΓi + (1− λ)υi;µ)
(Definition) = E
PFδ
Rk −Xi0 − σkW iT︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zi
− λ
∫ T
0
(git + Γ
i
t)dt− (1− λ)
∫ T
0
(wit + υ
i
t)dt

= E
[
PFδ
(
(λ(Zi −
∫ T
0
(git + Γ
i
t)dt) + (1− λ)(Zi −
∫ T
0
(wit + υ
i
t)dt
)]
(Fδ(x) convex) ≤ E
[
λPFδ
(
Zi −
∫ T
0
(git + Γ
i
t)dt
)
+ (1− λ)PFδ
(
Zi −
∫ T
0
(wit + υ
i
t)dt
)]
= λH i(gi,Γi;µ) + (1− λ)H i(wi, υi;µ)
Therefore, H i is convex, and J i is strictly convex.
We next establish the Gaˆteaux derivative of (4.4) exists and determine its explicit form.
Proposition 4.3 (Existence and form of Gaˆteaux derivative). The cost functional J i(·, ·;µ),
for i ∈ Kk, is everywhere Gaˆteaux differentiable in Ai in all directions. The Gaˆteaux deriva-
tive at a point (g,Γ) ∈ Ai in the direction of (ωg, ωΓ) admits the following representation
〈DJ i(gi,Γi;µ), ωg〉 = E
[∫ T
0
ωgt
(
ζk(git − hkt )− PY it
)
dt
]
,(4.9a)
〈DJ i(gi,Γi;µ), ωΓ〉 = E
[∫ T
0
ωΓt
(
γkΓt + S
µ
t − PY it
)
dt
]
,(4.9b)
where
(4.10) Y it = E
[
F ′δ(R
k −XiT )|Git
]
.
Proof. The Gaˆteaux derivative we seek are given by the limits
〈DJ i(gi,Γi;µ), ωg〉 := lim
→0
J i(gi + ωg,Γi;µ)− J i(gi,Γi;µ)

, and(4.11a)
〈DJ i(gi,Γi;µ), ωΓ〉 := lim
→0
J i(gi,Γi + ωΓ;µ)− J i(gi,Γi;µ)

.(4.11b)
We examine each of these limits in turn, starting with (4.11a). To this end,
J i(gi + ωg,Γi;µ)− J i(gi,Γi;µ) = E
[ ∫ T
0
ζk
2 (gt − hkt + ωgt )2 − ζ2(git − hkt )2dt
+ P Fδ(R
k −XiT − 
∫ T
0
ωgt dt)− P Fδ(Rk −XiT )
]
(4.12)
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which follows from the definition of the cost functional (4.4) and the state dynamics of Xit
(2.3). From Taylor expansion of Fδ, we have
Fδ(R
k −XiT − 
∫ T
0
ωgt dt) = Fδ(R
k −XiT )− 
∫ T
0
ωgt F
′
δ(R
k −XiT )dt+O(2)(4.13)
Substituting (4.13) into (4.12) and performing some algebra, we obtain
J i(gi + ωg,Γi;µ)− J i(gi,Γi;µ) = E
[

∫ T
0
ζk(git − hkt )ωgt dt−

∫ T
0
ωgt P F
′
δ(R
k −XiT )dt+O(2)
]
Dividing by  and taking limits on both sides implies
〈DJ i, ωg〉 = E
[∫ T
0
ζk(git − hkt )ωgt dt−
∫ T
0
ωgt P F
′
δ(R
k −XiT )dt
]
(4.14)
Next, apply iterated expectations we obtain
〈DJ i, ωg〉 = E
[∫ T
0
ζk(git − hkt ))ωgt dt−
∫ T
0
ωgt P E[F
′(Rk −XiT )|Git ]dt
]
(4.15)
= E
[∫ T
0
ωgt
(
ζk(git − hkt )− P Y it
)
dt
]
,(4.16)
as required. Through the same techniques applied to (4.11b), we obtain (4.9b) and the
proof is complete.
Before continuing, we make two observations about Y it . Firstly, for all agents i ∈ Kk,
the process Y it admits the representation Y
i
t = Y
(k)(t,Xit ;µ), for all t ∈ T,P-a.s. ([23, see
Prop 2.2]).
Secondly, Y it is approximately the non-compliance probability for firm i from sub-
population k. To see this, recall that Fδ(x) is a convex and differentiable approximation of
a(x) = (x)+, and
a′(x) =
{
1x>0, for x 6= 0
d.n.e, for x = 0.
Due to the differentiability assumption on Fδ, we have that F
′
δ(x)
δ→0−→ a′(x) pointwise a.e.,
and for δ sufficiently small
Y it = E
[
F ′δ(R
k −XiT )|Git
]
≈ E
[
a′(Rk −XiT )|Git
]
= P(Rk −XiT > 0|Git).
Thus, we often refer to Y it as the non-compliance probability for agent i at time t.
From Propositions 4.2 and 4.3, J i is convex and everywhere Gaˆteaux differentiable in
all directions. This implies that an element ν ∈ Ai that makes the Gaˆteaux derivative
vanish for all directions is a minimizer of J i, and moreover, that minimizer is unique. We
now establish the conditions which are sufficient and necessary for the Gaˆteaux derivative
to vanish, which allows us to find (4.5) and interpret the optimal controls in the context of
SREC markets.
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Proposition 4.4 (Vanishing of Gaˆteaux Derivative). The Gaˆteaux derivative (4.9a)-(4.9b)
vanishes in all directions if and only if:
git − hkt − PζkY it = 0, and(4.17a)
Γit − 1γk
(
PY it − St
)
= 0.(4.17b)
Proof. Sufficiency: Assume (4.17a)-(4.17b) holds. It is clear from Proposition 4.3 that
(4.18) 〈DJ i(gi,Γi;µ), ω〉 = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ai,
as required.
Necessity: Assume 〈DJ i(gi,Γi;µ), ω〉 = 0,∀ω ∈ Ai. We next show that (4.17a)-(4.17b)
hold. We prove this via the contrapositive.
Assume that (4.17a)-(4.17b) do not hold. Then
(4.19)
B =
{
(w, t) ∈ Ω× T :
(
ζk(gt − hkt )− PY it
)
(w) 6= 0 ∩
(
γkΓt − PY it + St
)
(w) 6= 0
}
has positive measure.
We further define:
Bpos :=
{
(w, t) ∈ Ω× T :
(
ζk(gt − hkt )− PYt
)
(w) > 0
}
, and(4.20)
Bneg :=
{
(w, t) ∈ Ω× T :
(
ζk(gt − hkt )− PYt
)
(w) < 0
}
.(4.21)
At least one of the two sets defined above has positive measure.
Suppose that Bpos has positive measure. Define the processes
ωgt :=
(
ζk(git − hkt )− PY it
)
+
, and(4.22)
ωΓt :=
(
γkΓit − PY it + Sµt
)
.(4.23)
As all processes on the RHS of both expressions are Gi-adapted, ωgt , ωΓt are as well. This
together with the boundedness of hkt , Y
i
t , and S
µ
t , and non-negativity of ω
g
t , imply that
(ωgt , ω
Γ
t ) ∈ Ai.
Therefore, from (4.9a), we obtain
〈DJ i, ωg〉 = E
[∫ T
0
ωgt
(
ζk(git − hkt )− PY it
)
dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
ζk(git − hkt )− PY it
)2
I{ζk(git − hkt )− PY it > 0}dt
]
> 0.
If, on the other hand, Bpos does not have positive measure, then Bneg must, as B
has positive measure. In this case, set ωgt =
(
ζk(git − hkt )− PYt
)
−. Once again, the pair
(ωg, ωΓ) ∈ Ai. In a manner similar to the above, we obtain that 〈DJ i, ωg〉 < 0. Hence, we
have found an admissible ωg such that 〈DJ i, ωg〉 6= 0.
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Next, from (4.9b), we obtain
〈DJ i, ωΓ〉 = E
[∫ T
0
ωΓt
(
γkΓit + S
µ
t − PY it
)
dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
γkΓit + S
µ
t − PY it
)2
dt
]
> 0
Thus 〈DJ i(gi,Γi), ω〉 6= 0, and the proof of necessity is complete.
These set of results allow us to determine the optimal controls in the mean-field game
limit.
Proposition 4.5 (Optimal Controls). Given a mean-field flow µ, the collection of controls
{gi,?t ,Γi,?t }i∈N is a unique solution to (4.5) if and only if for each agent i ∈ Kk, (gi,?t ,Γi,?t ) ∈
Ai, and the Gaˆteaux derivative vanishes for all ω ∈ Ai.
In particular, the optimal controls for agent i ∈ Kk are
gi,?t = h
k
t +
P
ζk
Y it , and(4.24)
Γi,?t =
1
γk
(
PY it − Sµt
)
.(4.25)
Proof. The first part of this proposition is taken care of by Proposition 4.2 and Propo-
sition 2.1 in [27].
All that remains is to show that gi,?t and Γ
i,?
t in (4.24)-(4.25) are admissible. Observe
that hkt is deterministic, non-negative, and bounded. Y
i
t is, moreover, non-negative and
bounded (by definition of Fδ), as well as Gi-adapted (by construction). Therefore, gi,? is
admissible.
Similarly, as Y i and Sµ are Gi-adapted, and bounded, clearly, (4.24)-(4.25) satisfy
Proposition 4.4, and we have completed the proof.
For agents i ∈ Kk, as Y it = Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ), the optimal controls specified in (4.24) and
(4.25) admit the representations
gi,?t = g
(k)(t,Xit ;µ), and(4.26)
Γi,?t = Γ
(k)(t,Xit , S
µ
t ;µ),(4.27)
for all t ∈ T,P-a.s, for some functions g(k) : R+×R×P(R) 7→ R and Γ(k) : R+×R2×P(R) 7→
R.
The controls in (4.24) and (4.25) provide us with insight about the nature of regulated
firms optimal behaviour. P Y it may be interpreted as the expected non-compliance cost
avoided by obtaining a marginal SREC. This can also be seen as the marginal benefit of
holding an additional SREC.
With this interpretation in mind, we can restate (4.24) as the following:
(4.28) ζk(g?t − hkt ) = P Y it .
This is equivalent to stating that the marginal cost of generation should be equal to the
marginal benefit of generation6. Isolating g?t suggests that a firm should generate their
6A similar result occurs in [35]
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baseline rate plus some amount proportional to the marginal benefit of holding an additional
SREC. This makes intuitive sense, as it implies a firm that is in danger of non-compliance
generates above their baseline in order to strive for compliance. Conversely, a firm that
is assured of compliance generates their baseline, which they obtain without incurring any
cost.
Similarly, we can interpret (4.25) as the optimal trading rate of a firm being proportional
to the difference between the marginal value of holding an SREC and the marginal value of
selling an SREC. This is scaled by the firm’s cost of trading. Once again, this is a natural
and intuitive result. If SREC prices are high relative to the benefit a firm would receive
from holding an SREC, a firm is more inclined to sell SRECs (and vice-versa). The degree
to which this occurs is dependent on the difference between these two quantities, as well as
the cost the firm incurs by partaking in the market (γk).
We emphasize here that the results in the preceding section hold given some µ. With
this, we obtain the existence and uniqueness of the optimal trading and optimal planned
generation of an arbitrary firm i in an arbitrary sub-population k through Proposition 4.5.
However, the mean-field distributions as discussed in Definition 4.1 are not arbitrary and
are not to be chosen freely. Specifically, they must correspond to the marginal distributions
of the agents SREC inventories. As per (2.3), the marginal distribution of an agent’s SREC
inventory is in fact governed by their optimal controls, which depend on µ. This circular
dependence underlies the core of the MFG methodology, and we must discuss how to find
such a µ. However, before doing so, we characterize the dependence of the firms optimal
controls on the mean-field distribution by finally obtaining Sµt that clears the market.
4.3. Equilibrium SREC Price. We begin this section by examining the SREC price im-
plied by the mean-field solution for the infinite-player game. Specifically, consider the SREC
price that results in the market clearing condition being satisfied, under the assumption that
firms behave per (4.24) and (4.25).
Proposition 4.6 (Equilibrium SREC Price in Infinite Player Game). In the setting of the
infinite-player game described in Section 4, we further assume that:
• The market clearing condition described in (4.3) holds
• Firms behave as per the optimal controls for the mean-field game (i.e. they generate
and trade according to (4.24) and (4.25)).
The equilibrium SREC price is then given by
(4.29) Sµt = P
K∑
k=1
ηk
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ) µ
(k)
t (dx),
where
ηk =
pik
γk∑
k′∈K
pik′
γk′
∈ (0, 1), ∀ k ∈ K.
Proof. We begin with the clearing condition.
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0 = lim
N→∞
∑N
i=1 Γ
i,?
t
N
= lim
N→∞
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
i=1
Γi,∗t
N
= lim
N→∞
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
i=1
1
Nγk
(
PY it − Sµt
)
= lim
N→∞
K∑
k=1
1
Nγk
Nk∑
i=1
PY it − Sµt lim
N→∞
K∑
k=1
Nk
Nγk
=⇒ Sµt =
limN→∞
∑K
k=1
P
Nγk
∑Nk
i=1 Y
i
t∑K
k=1
pik
γk
=
limN→∞
∑K
k=1
PNk
Nγk
∑Nk
i=1
Y it
Nk∑K
k=1
pik
γk
= P
K∑
k=1
ηk
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ) µ
(k)
t (dx),(4.30)
where
ηk =
pik
γk∑
k′∈K
pik′
γk′
∈ (0, 1), ∀ k ∈ K.
as required. The third equality follows by substituting (4.25), and all subsequent equalities
arise by algebraic manipulation, (2.2), the definition of µ
(k)
t , and limit laws.
As a reminder, Y
(k)
t may be interpreted as the functional representation of firm-i’s
non-compliance probability, when firm i belongs to sub-population k. As such, (4.30) may
be interpreted as follows: (i) The expression
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx) is the average non-
compliance probability within sub-population k, and (ii) the SREC equilibrium price is a
weighted average over sub-populations (scaled by P ) where the weights are proportional to
the ratio of that sub-population and its trading costs pik
γk
.
The form of (4.30) implies a few notable properties of the SREC price. By the definition
of Y it (and hence its Markov representation, Y
(k)(,˙)˙) in (4.10), Sµt ∈ [0, P ] as expected.
SREC prices increase as firms increase their non-compliance probabilities, which results
from the fact that increasing demand for SRECs (from firms who are far from compliance)
increases the price. The opposite holds true as well; as firms decrease their non-compliance
probabilities (that is, they are highly likely to comply), the SREC price decreases.
Finally, while Y iT is either 0 or 1 for all i ∈ N, depending on whether firm i has sufficient
SRECs to comply, it does not imply that Sµt converges to 0 or P , as the SREC price is a
weighted average of non-compliance probabilities across all agents/types.
We now specify the form of the equilibrium price Sg,Γt in the finite-player game. As
previously mentioned, this is derived endogenously, through the optimal behaviours that
emerge from the agents optimizing their respective cost functionals, and the market clearing
condition (3.5).
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Proposition 4.7 (Market Clearing SREC Price in Finite Player Game). In the setting of
the finite-player game described in Section 2, suppose that:
1. The market clearing condition (3.5) holds.
2. Firms behave as per the optimal controls for the mean-field game (i.e. they generate
and trade according to (4.24) and (4.25))7.
The market-clearing SREC price is
(4.31) Sg,Γt = P
∑
k∈K
Nk
Nγk
∑
i∈Kk
Y it
Nk∑
k∈K
Nk
Nγk
.
Proof. We note that the market clearing condition in (3.5) is equivalent to the condition∑N
i=1 Γ
i,?
t = 0, as N is finite. We begin with this.
0 =
N∑
i=1
Γi,?t =
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
i=1
Γi,∗t
=
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
i=1
1
γk
(
PY it − Sg,Γt
)
=
K∑
k=1
1
γk
Nk∑
i=1
PY it − Sg,Γt
K∑
k=1
Nk
γk
=⇒ Sg,Γt =
∑K
k=1
P
γk
∑Nk
i=1 Y
i
t∑K
k=1
Nk
γk
=
∑K
k=1
PNk
Nγk
∑Nk
i=1
Y it
Nk∑K
k=1
Nk
Nγk
,(4.32)
as required. The second equality arises from substituting (4.25), and each subsequent
equality is through simple algebraic operations.
The equilibrium SREC price in the finite-player game has many of the same properties
as the market clearing SREC price in the infinite player game. Namely, it also takes values
on the range [0, P ], is impacted the same way by the non-compliance probabilities of the
regulated firms, and is not necessarily pinned to 0 or P as t → T . The finite population
market clearing SREC price (4.31), however, is stochastic, as Y it = Y
(k)(t,Xit ;µ), for i ∈ Kk,
and Xit is stochastic. This is in contrast to (4.29), which is deterministic, as discussed in
the remark below.
Remark 4.8. It is well known that mean-field games with only minor agents result in a
deterministic mean-field measure flow of states (see [38]). Consequently, µ
(k)
t is a determin-
istic measure flow across t ∈ T, for all k ∈ K. As a result, Sµt is also deterministic.
4.4. An FBSDE for the Mean-Field Controls. While we have obtained form of the
agents’ optimal controls (given µ), we have not yet solved for them. Additionally, we have
not specified the mean-field distributions µ.
7Modified for the version of the price they observe
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Recall that agent-i’s optimal controls are governed by (4.24) and (4.25), and are affine
transformations of Y it and the clearing price. Moreover, Y
i
t is a stochastic process that
admits the representation Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ). Additionally, recall that, for each k ∈ K, (µ(k)t )t∈T
represents the mean-field distributions of Xit across agents i ∈ Kk.
To fully specify the optimal controls of a regulated LSE in an SREC market, we must
characterize Y as well as µ. Specifically, we need to find the fixed-point of µ such that
the optimal controls given the choice of µ imply a controlled state process Xit over i with
distribution µ. To achieve this, we first formulate Y it as a component of a solution to the
FBSDE specified in Corollary 4.9.
Corollary 4.9 (FBSDE Formulation). The triple (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t), given (µt)t∈T, for i ∈ Kk,
satisfies the FBSDE
dXit =
(
hkt + υ
k PY it − P 1γ˜k
K∑
k=1
pik
γk
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ) µ
(k)
t (dx)
)
dt+ σkt dW
i
t ,(4.33a)
Xi0 = ξ
i,(4.33b)
dY it = Z
i
t dW
i
t ,(4.33c)
Y iT = F
′
δ(R
k −XiT ),(4.33d)
where
(4.34) γ˜k := γk
K∑
k′=1
pik′/γ
k′ , and υk := ( 1
γk
+ 1
ζk
)
and ξi ∼ µ(k)0 .
In (4.33), there are K distinct forms of equations (each agent within a sub-population
satisfies the same form of FBSDE).
Proof. Substitute (4.24), (4.25), and (4.29) into (2.3) to obtain (4.33a). Observe that
Yt is a martingale, and hence can be expressed as in (4.33c) (see Chapter 6 of [50]).
We next aim to solve for the fixed-point. That is, we seek a mean-field distribution
µ and a progressively measurable triple (Xi, Y i, Zi) = (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t)t∈T that satisfies (4.33),
such that µ
(k)
t coincides with L(Xit) for all i ∈ Kk, for all k ∈ K. This is a fixed point
problem on the space of flows of measures.
At this fixed point, µ
(k)
t is replaced with L(Xit) in (4.33), and results in the FBSDE
becoming a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE (MV-FBSDE). Such equations are characterized by
their dependence on the law of its solution and arise in the probabilistic formulation of
mean-field games. For more details on MV-FBSDEs, see Chapter 3.2.2 of [13]. Armed with
a solution to the MV-FBSDEs, we arrive at the full characterization of all agents’ optimal
actions (4.5) and the resulting equilibrium SREC price (4.29).
Solving MV-FBSDEs analytically is difficult, in all but the simplest situations. Rather,
we devise a numerical scheme to solve the MV-FBSDE and relegate the presentation and
discussion of this scheme to Appendix A. We use our numerical scheme to perform a variety
of experiments, which we discuss in Section 6.
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5. The -Nash property. Thus far, we have considered the mean field game version of
our original problem. That is, we let the number of agents tends towards infinity, which
provides a more tractable problem to solve. However, it remains to relate the solution
of this mean field problem to the problem we originally started with. That is, we must
demonstrate that solving the mean field problem (4.5), (4.3) corresponds to some form of
solution for the original (finite-player) problem (2.3), (3.4)-(3.5).
From the previous section, recall that the solution to (4.5) corresponds to the solution
to a fixed point problem involving the FBSDE (4.33). We take for granted that we will
be able to solve this fixed point (using the algorithm alluded to in the prior section and
discussed in Appendix A) and obtain a mean field distribution µ such that the optimal
controls implied by (4.24) and (4.25) imply a solution to the FSDE (4.33a)-(4.33b) that has
a marginal distribution coinciding with µ.
The (assumed) existence of this solution implies that we have found {{gi,Γi} ∈ Ai}∞i=1
which form a Nash equilibrium. The solution to the mean field problem does not form a
Nash equilibrium for the finite-player problem. However, we aim to show that it forms a
slightly weaker solution, called an -Nash equilibrium.
Remark 5.1. In this section, we express the (finite-player) performance criterion through
the notation J i(gi,Γi, g−i,Γ−i), where g−i = (g1, ..., gi−1, gi+1, ..., gN ), and Γ−i is defined
analogously.
Definition 5.2. (-Nash equilibrium) In the finite-player (N -player) game, a set of con-
trols U? = {(gi,?,Γi,?) ∈ A(N), i ∈ N} forms an -Nash equilibrium for the collection of
objective functionals {J i, i ∈ Kk, k ∈ K} if there exists an  > 0 such that
(5.1)
J i(gi,?,Γi,?, g−i,?,Γ−i,?) ≥ inf
(gi,Γi)∈A(N)
J i(gi,Γi, g−i,?,Γ−i,?) ≥ J i(gi,?,Γi,?, g−i,?,Γ−i,?)− ,
for all i ∈ Kk, k ∈ K.
Intuitively, if an agent unilaterally deviates from the set of strategies U?, it can at most
benefit by . We will show that the controls given by (4.24) and (4.25), which are fully
specified by the solution to the fixed point problem presented in Subsection 4.4 satisfy the
-Nash property once the population size is ‘large enough’. Note that the -Nash property
is achieved with respect to the full-information admissible control set A(N), which are not
restricted to be decentralized. Once demonstrated, this shows that for an N -player game,
there is a certain ‘tolerance’ (value of ) which determines how close the decentralized Ai-
adapted solutions to the MFG problem are to the true Nash equilibrium. We show that 
decreases as N increases.
In order to prove this property, we first introduce another assumption.
Assumption 4. We assume that the Markovian representation Y i = Y
(k)
t (t,X
i
t ;µ), ∀i ∈
Kk, that solves (4.33), is Lipschitz continuous in the second argument, with Lipschitz con-
stant L(k) > 0.
With this assumption out of the way, we proceed with stating the proposition that we
will prove in order to show our mean-field solutions have the desired -Nash property. First,
we define and prove a useful lemma that will help us with this.
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Lemma 5.3. Let (g,Γ) ∈ A(N) be some arbitrary admissible control and (g−i,?,Γ−i,?) be
the collection of optimal controls given by (4.24) and (4.25) for all agents except agent i
(i.e. N − 1 other agents). Then
(5.2) |J i(g,Γ, g−i,?,Γ−i,?)− J i(g,Γ)| = o(δN ) + o( 1√N )
Proof. We begin with the LHS of (5.17).
∣∣∣J i(g,Γ, g−i,?,Γ−i,?)− J i(g,Γ)∣∣∣(5.3)
=
∣∣∣∣E [∫ T
0
Γt(S
(N)
t − Sµt )dt
]∣∣∣∣
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Γt(S(N)t − Sµt )∣∣∣ dt]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
|Γt|
∣∣∣(S(N)t − Sµt )∣∣∣ dt]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
|Γt|2 dt
]1
2
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Sµt − S(N)t ∣∣∣2 dt]
1
2
.(5.4)
We use the notation S
(N)
t to differentiate this from the clearing price in the finite population
when all agents behave as per their optimal controls. The first inequality arises by Jensen’s,
the second by monotonicity of expectation and properties of absolute values, and the third
by Cauchy-Schwarz. As Γ is an admissible strategy, it is square integrable. Hence, the first
term of the RHS of (5.4) is bounded by some finite constant M1. Therefore, we only need
to concern ourselves with the second term, and ensure it goes to 0 at an appropriate rate.
Therefore, we will find the rate of E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Sµt − S(N)t ∣∣∣2 dt]. We have dropped the ex-
ponent here - we will simply take the square root of the rate we find for this expression
instead.
First, we must specify Sµt and S
(N)
t . By definition, S
µ
t is as in (4.29). The deviation of
firm i from their optimal control to an arbitrary control makes no difference in the limit,
and the impact of individual firms disappears here. Instead, this price is dependent only on
the mean field distribution of states across agents (implicitly assuming that all other agents
are acting optimally).
On the other hand S
(N)
t does not have the form in (4.31), as firm i does have an impact
here through their choice of an arbitrary control. Therefore, we must use the clearing
condition again to derive this. Define
(5.5) K?k := {j ∈ N| agent j belongs to sub-population k and j 6= i},
and |K?k| := N?k := Nk − Ii∈Kk . The clearing condition becomes
(5.6)
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈K?k
Γi,?t + Γt = 0
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By substituting (4.25)8 and isolating for S
(N)
t , we obtain
(5.7) S
(N)
t =
∑K
k=1
PN?k
Nγk
∑N?k
i=1
Y it
N?k∑K
k=1
N?k
Nγk
+
Γt
N∑K
k=1
N?k
Nγk
Therefore, we obtain
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Sµt − S(N)t ∣∣∣2 dt]
= E

∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
∑K
k=1
pik
γk
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)∑
k′∈K
pik′
γk′︸ ︷︷ ︸
At
−
∑K
k=1
PN?k
Nγk
∑N?k
i=1
Y it
N?k∑K
k=1
N?k
Nγk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bt
−
Γt
N∑K
k=1
N?k
Nγk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ct
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
dt

= E
[∫ T
0
|At −Bt − Ct|2 dt
]
≤ 2E
[∫ T
0
(At −Bt)2dt
]
+ 2E
[∫ T
0
C2t dt
]
= 2E
[∫ T
0
(At −Bt)2dt
]
+ o
(
1
N2
)(5.8)
Now, it remains to find the rate at which E
[∫ T
0 (At −Bt)2dt
]
goes to 0, and in particular,
show it is o(δ2N ) + o
(
1
N
)
.
First, we make some definitions in order to ease our notational burden. Define
αk :=
P
γkN
, ρk :=
Ppik
γk
(5.9)
ψ :=
∑
k∈K
N?k
Nγk
, β :=
∑
k∈K
pik
γk
.(5.10)
We then obtain
E
[∫ T
0
(At −Bt)2dt
]
(5.11)
=E
∫ T
0
 K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,X
i,(N)
t ;µ)−
K∑
k=1
ρk
β
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
2 dt
(5.12)
Here, in addition to making the substitutions detailed above, we substitute the Marko-
vian forms of Y i, as per Assumption 4. We denote the state variable in the first term as
X
i,(N)
t to emphasize that this is the function Y
(k) being applied at the value of SRECs
8Modified for the version of the price that the players observe in a finite-player setting
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that each firm finds itself at in the original finite-player game. That is, their SREC inven-
tory with all agents except agent i behaving as per their optimal controls (agent i simply
has an arbitrary control) and with the implied SREC price that clears the market in the
finite-player game.
From here, we proceed as follows, in a manner similar to [40]:
= E
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,X
i,(N)
t ;µ)−
K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)
+
K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)−
K∑
k=1
ρk
β
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
)2
dt
]
≤2E
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,X
i,(N)
t ;µ)−
K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
(1)
t
)2
dt
]
+2E
[ ∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)−
K∑
k=1
ρk
β
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
(2)
t
)2
dt
]
(5.13)
Above, we added and subtracted the same term and used the inequality (a + b)2 ≤
2a2 + 2b2. We note that Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ) represents the function Y
(k) being applied at the
value of the SRECs each firm finds itself at in the infinite-player game. That is, their SREC
inventory with the price following the deterministic price path of (4.30) (recall, the fact that
agent i has an arbitrary control makes no difference, as they have no individual impact in
the mean field limit).
We will bound each of the terms in (5.13) separately.
First, we start with E
[∫ T
0 (D
(1)
t )
2dt
]
.
E
[∫ T
0
(D
(1)
t )
2dt
]
= E
∫ T
0
 K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
(Y (k)(t,X
i,(N)
t ;µ)− Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ))
2 dt

≤ KE
∫ T
0
K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
[Y (k)(t,X
i,(N)
t ;µ)− Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)]
2 dt

≤ K
K∑
k=1
α2k
ψ E
∫ T
0
N?k∑
i=1
L(k)
[
X
i,(N)
t −Xit
]2 dt

≤ K
K∑
k=1
α2k
ψ N
?
kE
∫ T
0
N?k∑
i=1
(
L(k)
[
X
i,(N)
t −Xit
])2
dt
 = o( 1
N
)
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The first inequality arises as a consequence of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The
second inequality uses Assumption 4 and exchanges the order of summation, expectation,
and integration (which we can do easily as it is a finite sum). The third inequality again is
a consequence of Cauchy-Schwarz. The final equality uses the definition of αk, and the fact
that X
i,(N)
t → Xit as N →∞ at a rate. We do not bother ourselves with the exact rate of
convergence for the latter term since it makes the convergence of E
[∫ T
0 (D
(1)
t )
2dt
]
to zero
at least as fast as 1N , and we will show that the rate of convergence for E
[∫ T
0 (D
(2)
t )
2dt
]
is
1
N .
We now focus on E
[∫ T
0 (D
(2)
t )
2dt
]
. Once we obtain the required rate (o
(
δ2N
)
+ o(
(
1
N
)
)
for this term, we will be done.
E
[∫ T
0
(D
(2)
t )
2dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)−
K∑
k=1
ρk
β
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
)2
dt
]
= E
[(∫ T
0
K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)−
K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
(1)
t
+
K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)−
K∑
k=1
ρk
β
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
(2)
t
)2
dt
]
(5.14)
Once again, we have simply added and subtracted the same term within the expression,
leaving the value unchanged. We now consider G
(2)
t alone:
G
(2)
t =
K∑
k=1
αkN
?
k
ψ
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)−
K∑
k=1
αkN
?
k
β
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
+
K∑
k=1
αkN
?
k
β
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)−
K∑
k=1
ρk
β
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
=
∑
k
αkN
?
k
ψβ
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
( K∑
k=1
1
γk
(pik − N
?
k
N )
)
+
∑K
k=1
P
γk
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)∑K
k=1
pik
γk
(
N?k
N
− pik
)
=o(δN )(5.15)
Once again, the first equality arises from adding and subtracting the same term, and the
second equality is simply algebra and factoring the expressions appropriately. The final
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equality occurs because the boundedness of Y (k)9 guarantees the integrals are finite, and
hence the entire expression will go to 0 at the rate of the sequence of numbers {δN}.
Referring back to (5.14), we obtain
E
[∫ T
0
(D
(2)
t )
2dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
G
(1)
t + o(δN )
)2
dt
]
≤ 2E
[∫ T
0
(
G
(1)
t
)2
dt
]
+ o(δ2N )(5.16)
Finally, all that remains is to find the rate for E
[∫ T
0
(
G
(1)
t
)2
dt
]
.
E
[∫ T
0
(
G
(1)
t
)2
dt
]
=E
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)−
K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
N?k∑
i=1
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
)2
dt
]
(Definition)
=E
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
αk
ψ
{N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)−
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
})2
dt
]
(Collecting sums)
=ψ−2KE
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
α2k
{N?k∑
i=1
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)−
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
}2)
dt
]
(Cauchy-Schwarz)
=ψ−2KE
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
α2k
N?k∑
i=1
{
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)−
∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx)
}2)
dt
]
(Cross-terms indep’t)
=ψ−2KE
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
α2k
N?k∑
i=1
{∫ [
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)− Y (k)(t, x;µ)
]
µ
(k)
t (dx)
}2)
dt
]
(Algebra)
≤ψ−2KE
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
α2k
N?k∑
i=1
{∫ [
Y (k)(t,Xit ;µ)− Y (k)(t, x;µ)
]2
µ
(k)
t (dx)
})
dt
]
(Jensen’s)
≤ψ−2KE
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
α2k
N?k∑
i=1
{∫ [
L(k)(x−Xit)
]2
µ
(k)
t (dx)
})
dt
]
(Assumption 4)
=ψ−2K(L(k))2E
[∫ T
0
( K∑
k=1
α2k
N?k∑
i=1
{∫
(x2 + (Xit)
2 − 2xXit)µ(k)t (dx)
})
dt
]
(Expanding terms)
=2ψ−2K(L(k))2
( K∑
k=1
α2k
N?k∑
i=1
Var(Xit)
)
(Moving expectation within sum and simplifying)
=o
(
1
N
)
(Definition of αk and finite variance of X
i
t)
Consequently, E
[∫ T
0 (D
(2)
t )
2dt
]
converges to zero at the rate 1N , and we are done. If we
9Recall that Y is bounded by its definition.
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follow the chain of expressions back up to (5.4), we can see that we obtain the rate specified
in the statement of the lemma.
Now, we may state and prove the -Nash property for our problem.
Proposition 5.4 (-Nash Property). Consider the collection of cost functionals J i, as
defined in (3.3), and the optimal controls {g?,Γ?} defined through (4.24) and (4.25)10.
Suppose that there exists a sequence {δN}∞N=1 such that δN → 0, and |NkN − pik| = o(δN ) for
all k ∈ K. Then
(5.17)
J i(gi,?,Γi,?, g−i,?,Γ−i,?) ≥ inf
(gi,Γi)∈A(N)
J i(gi,Γi, g−i,?,Γ−i,?) ≥ J i(gi,?,Γi,?, g−i,?,Γ−i,?)− ,
for all i ∈ Kk, k ∈ K.
In particular,  = o( 1√
N
) + o(δN ).
Proof. We first observe that by the definition of the infimum, the left-hand inequality
in (5.17) is immediately satisfied. It remains to show that the right-hand inequality is also
satisfied.
Observe that for any arbitrary controls (g,Γ) ∈ A(N), Lemma 5.3 implies
J i(g,Γ, g−i,?,Γ−i,?) ≥ J i(g,Γ)− o(δN )− o( 1√N )
≥ J i(g?,Γ?)− o(δN )− o( 1√N ),(5.18)
where we use the fact that J i(g?,Γ?) = inf(g,Γ)∈Ai J i(g,Γ), and that in the infinite-player
limit optimization with respect to the centralized A(N) and decentralized Ai control ad-
missible sets are equivalent as the agents get decoupled from each other and the additional
information on other agents’ states does not improve the individual objective functionals
further.
Using Lemma 5.3 again, we may rewrite this as
(5.19) J i(g,Γ, g−i,?,Γ−i,?) ≥ J i(g?,Γ?, g−i,?,Γ−i,?)− 2o(δN )− 2o( 1√N )
Since this holds for any arbitrary controls (g,Γ) ∈ A(N), we may take the inf over the left
side of this inequality, and it will still hold. We may also cancel out the constant terms in
front of the little-o terms. This yields the final result:
(5.20) inf
(gi,Γi)∈A(N)
J i(gi,Γi, g−i,?,Γ−i,?) ≥ J i(gi,?,Γi,?, g−i,?,Γ−i,?)− o(δN )− o( 1√N )
as required.
10We repeat for emphasis and completeness that these optimal controls are only fully specified by the
solution to the fixed point problem presented in Subsection 4.4
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6. Numerical Experiments. In this section, we present the results of numerical experi-
ments which reveal significant qualitative characteristics about how regulated firms behave
in this model and the associated implications of this behaviour. We aim for these experi-
ments to be illustrative and provide insight into the agents’ optimal behaviour in emissions
markets while explicitly accounting for trading frictions and interactions between them,
which to the authors’ knowledge, has not been done before.
There are many viable experiments that one could run within this model framework,
especially when considering the potential variety and number of sub-populations of load
serving entities that are regulated by SREC markets. As such, we restrict focus to a handful
of interesting and meaningful experiments that allow us to draw insights into the drivers of
optimal behaviour in SREC markets, the nature of the interaction between agents, and the
outcomes of agents acting optimally.
The scarcity of accessible data introduces a significant challenge for obtaining calibrated
model parameters. For example, we do not have data relating to costs firms incur for
choosing to generate or trade SRECs. Consequently, we instead focus on highlighting the
key features and outcomes that we believe are applicable to any emissions market system,
and aligning said features and outcomes with economic arguments that justify their validity
and applicability. That is, we provide normative rather than informative results.
For the first set of numerical experiments, we use the parameters reported in Tables 2
and 3. For simplicity of analysis and interpretation, we choose hkt and σ
k
t to be constant
and set Xi0 ∼ N(νk0 , ψk0 ) for all i ∈ Kk, with the values specified in Table 3.
n ∆t T P ($/SREC) Rk (SREC) K
1 152 1 1 1 (same across sub-populations) 2
Table 2: Compliance parameters.
Sub-population pik h
k σk ζk γk νk0 ψ
k
0
k = 1 0.25 0.2 0.1 1.75 1.25 0.6 0.1
k = 2 0.75 0.5 0.15 1.25 1.75 0.2 0.1
Table 3: Model Parameters.
As T = 1, n = 1, we are focused on a single-period SREC market that takes place over a
year. Firms must submit 1 SREC at T , and pay a penalty of $1 for every SREC they fail to
submit. We assume K = 2, with each sub-population having parameters detailed in Table
3. Specifically, we assume a 3:1 ratio in favour of sub-population 2. When comparing the
two sub-populations, we see that sub-population 2 has a greater generation rate (hk) and a
slightly higher volatility associated with generation (σk) than sub-population 1. They also
have lower generation costs (ζk), while experiencing a higher level of trading costs (γk).
Finally, we see the average initial inventory of firms in sub-population 2 is lower than in
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Figure 2: Optimal firm behaviour as a function of banked SRECs for various time-steps,
for a representative firm from each sub-population. Parameters in Tables 2 and 3.
sub-population 1.
6.1. Optimal Behaviour Summary. A regulated firm’s optimal behaviour is one of
the key outputs from (4.33). Figure 2 shows the dependence of the optimal trading and
generation rate on banked SRECs for a representative agent of each sub-population through
time. The equilibrium SREC price Sµt is implicitly accounted for through the solution of
the MV-FBSDE. In this mean-field limit, individual firms have no impact on the price.
One clear pattern seen in Figure 2 is the existence of distinct regimes of generation /
trading. This pattern also arises in the single-agent problem (see [52]). At low levels of
SREC inventory, and towards the end of the period, firms in both sub-populations generate
/ purchase until the marginal cost of producing / purchasing an additional SREC exceeds P .
This occurs because, in this case, the firm almost certainly fails to comply. By generating
or purchasing an additional SREC, the firm avoids paying an additional penalty of P , and
as such, it is in their best interests to do so until the cost of generation / trading exceeds
that value. This follows the classic microeconomic principle of conducting an activity until
the marginal benefit of that activity equals its marginal cost.
As a firm obtains more SRECs, they reach a point where the marginal benefit from
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an additional SREC is less than P . Specifically, as the probability of compliance increases
increases from near 0, additional SRECs no longer provide a marginal benefit of P (as
additional SRECs above Rk must either be sold for less than P , or expire worthless). As
such, it is no longer necessary for firms to generate / purchase in such quantities, leading to a
decrease in both quantities. Once again, the firm adjusts its behaviour so that the marginal
costs of purchasing and trading are in line with the marginal benefit the firm receives from
doing so. This may also lead to the firm selling SRECs as opposed to purchasing them - in
this case, the net proceeds from sales exceed the value of an additional SREC to the firm.
This decrease occurs until the firm reaches a point where it no longer benefits from
additional SRECs. Specifically, this means that an additional SREC does not impact a
firms compliance probability (implying their compliance probability is 1), nor can they sell
it for profit. Consequently, we observe another plateau where the firm plans to generate
at its baseline hk and plans to sell SRECs at the value for which the marginal revenue
from the sale equals the cost of selling. The previous observations are consistent for each
sub-population.
The optimal firm behaviour detailed above, along with their initial inventory (deter-
mined by the distribution of Xi0, i ∈ Kk) also imply a mean-field distribution of SREC
inventory levels across agents of each sub-population. We examine this distribution across
each agent sub-population and for various times t ∈ T in Figure 3.
From Figure 3, we can make some notable observations. For both sub-populations,
we see the initial distribution is concentrated around their respective mean νk0 . As time
progresses, mass shifts upwards, as firms accumulate SRECs, culminating with the mass
being concentrated around Rk as t approaches T . This is also reflected in the bottom
panel, which shows the distribution of SREC inventory across all agent types, incorporating
the relative frequency of each sub-population. It shows the bimodal nature of the initial
distribution slowly converge to a unimodal distribution by the time the compliance period
ends, with the mode occurring near the requirement.
The patterns detailed above are expected, as they indicate agents aim to satisfy the
compliance requirements. Specifically, about 62% of agents in sub-population 1 and 61%
of agents in sub-population 2 meet the requirement. It is worth noting that the optimal
behaviour for firms does not result in every firm complying exactly.
The primary cause of this phenomenon is that firms do not have absolute control over
their SREC production. While the firm plans to generate at a rate of gi, they over or
under-generate due to, e.g., variation in sunlight. If a firm severely under-generates, they
may not be able to comply. The market frictions imposed by our model, such as trading
costs also constrain firms’ behaviours, which may also force non-compliance.
Additionally, in a single-period SREC model with no banking, a terminal SREC in-
ventory above the requirement necessarily implies some SRECs are squandered, as unused
SRECs at time T are worthless. As such, the funds used to acquire these spare SRECs
(either through generation or trading) are also wasted. This means that it is typically not
optimal to accumulate far more than Rk SRECs, as firms must strike a balance between se-
curing compliance and risking unnecessary investment. The natural incentive for all firms is
to just barely satisfy the requirement, as opposed to exactly satisfying it (which would waste
no SRECs), so that they are partially protected from a potential random under-generation.
As alluded to earlier, in the mean-field limit, the equilibrium SREC price that the firms
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Figure 3: Distribution of SREC inventory over time for each agent sub-population (sub-
population 1 in top row, sub-population 2 in middle row, all agents in bottom row). Pa-
rameters in Tables 2 and 3.
transact at is not impacted by any individual agent. Rather, as per (4.29), it is determined
by the collective distribution of agents. Consequently, the equilibrium SREC price Sµt is an
output of our algorithm, as opposed to a state variable or an input. The initial distribution
of agent states amongst sub-populations and the optimal behaviour of each regulated agent
throughout the period implies a value for Sµt over time. With the parameter choices made
in Tables Table 2 and Table 3, the Sµt implied by the mean-field optimal controls is nearly
constant throughout the compliance period, at a value of roughly 0.39.
Careful examination of the form of (4.29) can provide insight as to why this occurs.
First, from general results (see [38]), we know that the mean-field measure flow is deter-
ministic. Second, the only term which potentially varies over time in the formula for Sµt is∫
Y (k)(t, x;µ)µ
(k)
t (dx) and represents the expected non-compliance probability of an agent
in sub-population k. The near-constant nature of Sµt indicates that this quantity does not
change much over time in the infinite-population limit. This suggests that, in the infinite-
population limit, the mean-field distribution µ
(k)
t changes over time in such a way that such
that expected non-compliance probabilities are essentially constant. That is, the trajectory
of the average non-compliance probability across each sub-population of agents at each time
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t is constant. When we explore the finite-player game in Subsection 6.2, we show that the
empirical distribution of agents’ states is stochastic, in contrast to the mean-field limit.
6.2. Finite-player Simulation. While the previous subsections focus on studying the
behaviour and properties of the solution to the infinite population stochastic game, we now
turn our attention to the finite population game. We study the infinite player game because
it is more tractable than the finite player stochastic game. However, it is worth numerically
studying how the infinite-population solution fares when applied to a more realistic finite-
population game, and the associated implications on the SREC price (which is now the
market clearing SREC price described by (4.31), as opposed to the equilibrium SREC price
described by (4.29)).
We simulate a compliance period for N firms, using the same model and compliance
parameters as in Table 2 and Table 3, and letting N = 200011. That is, we assume 500
firms from sub-population 1 and 1500 firms from sub-population 2. For each firm, we
draw their initial SREC inventory from µk0 (using the appropriate sub-population), and
simulate forward. At each time-step, each firm chooses their planned generation and trading
behaviour, as per (4.24) and (4.25), while being able to observe the SREC price. In doing
so, each firm is exposed to their idiosyncratic SREC production noise, which in turn impacts
the agents’ state in the next time-step, as well as the SREC price. This continues across
the entire period.
We first summarize the overall behaviours of agents of each sub-population by plotting,
in Figure 4, histograms of their initial and terminal SRECs, as well as their total generation
and trading.
As expected, we see that most firms from both sub-populations take actions such
that their terminal SREC inventory is near Rk = 1. The non-compliance rates for sub-
populations 1 and 2 are about 0.42 and 0.40, respectively. The means of the total generation
and trading for firms from each sub-population are slightly higher than 0.4 and 0.8, respec-
tively. These figures correspond to the average amount of SRECs below the requirement
firms from each sub-population begin the compliance period with. We also see that total
generation and trading in the finite player game is relatively symmetric.
Finally, we note that the shapes of the optimal generation and trading histograms are
similar within sub-populations, suggesting there may be some correlation between firm-level
optimal generation and trading over the course of a compliance period. Given the forms of
(4.24) and (4.25), we would expect this to be the case.
To see this, consider (4.24)
gi,?t = ht +
P
ζk
Y it =⇒ PY it = ζk(gi,?t − ht),
11This is not a particularly large number of firms - the Sweden-Norway REC market regulated upwards
of 9,000 solar firms in 2018 (see [1])
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Figure 4: Histograms of initial (red) and terminal (blue) SRECs (left panel), generation
rate (middle panel), trading rate (right panel). Parameters in Tables 2 and 3.
substitute into (4.25) for Γi,?t
12, and integrate from 0 to T , to obtain
(6.1)
∫ T
0
Γi,?t =
ζk
γk
∫ T
0
gi,?t dt−
∫ T
0
(
ζk
γk
ht − S
g,Γ
t
γk
)
dt.
From (6.1), total trading and planned generation have a linear relationship, with slope
ζk
γk
. This reflects the fact that firms with a relatively high cost of generation prefer to trade,
and vice-versa. To confirm that this relationship holds in the simulation, we plot the total
generation versus trading stratified by sub-population in Figure 5.
The positive linear relationship, in conjunction with the relatively small variance of
terminal SRECs (as firms tend to target the requirement almost exactly in order to avoid
wasting resources on spare SRECs) suggest that firms who experience under-generation
12Recall that we assume the agents use the MFG strategy applied to the system they observe, hence the
use of the finite-player market clearing SREC price rather than the infinite-player equilibrium SREC price
described by Sµt
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Figure 5: Total generation vs total trading across a compliance period. Parameters in
Tables 2 and 3, for sub-population 1 (red) and sub-population 2 (blue).
increases planned generation and purchasing to account for it, with firms experiencing
over-generation doing the opposite.
We next examine the firms’ trading and generation behaviour across the compliance
period. To this end, we plot each firm’s generation and trading rates over the course of the
compliance period, colour coded by the sub-population they belong to, in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Planned generation (left) and trading rates (right) in finite-player simulation with
parameters as in 2 and 3, for sub-population 1 (red) and sub-population 2 (blue).
Figure 6 shows the differences between the two sub-populations planned generation and
trading rates.As expected, firms from sub-population 1 generate less than those from sub-
population 2, due to their lower baseline generation rate and higher cost of generation.
The trading rates across firms from different sub-populations largely overlap one another,
though the firms from sub-population 1 typically have more extreme behaviour, reflecting
their increased capability to participate in the market when compared to firms from sub-
population 2.
Next, we look at the distribution of states across agents to ensure the distribution of
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Figure 7: Empirical and theoretical distribution of SREC inventory over time for each
sub-population separately and jointly. Parameters in Tables 2 and 3.
agents in the finite-player sample agrees with those from the mean-field game (see Figure 3).
To this end, Figure 7 shows histograms of the agents states across the compliance period
overlaid on the mean-field distribution (scaled for finite-population).
From the figure, we can see that the empirical and theoretical distributions are in
alignment with one another, suggesting numerically that the infinite-population solution is
a reasonable approximation for the optimal controls of the agents in the finite-population
problem, provided the number of agents is sufficiently large.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium SREC price
in finite-player setting. Parameters
in Tables 2 and 3.
Finally, we examine the how the equilibrium
SREC price evolves in this finite-population game,
when compared to the infinite-population scenario.
To do so, we plot the implied equilibrium SREC
price, St, which is endogenously derived at all times
t through (4.31), in Figure 8.
The most immediate difference is that the SREC
price now has notable variation. More specifically,
this variation is determined by the states of the
agents, which themselves depend on the degree of
over/under-generation that they experience.
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In this case, we see that the SREC price stays
relatively constant for the first three quarters of the
compliance period, then rapidly increases over the
remainder. This suggests that firms non-compliance
probabilities increased over the final parts of the pe-
riod, resulting in increased demand for SRECs, as firms scramble to ensure they comply.
Additionally, we see that the SREC price does not converge to either 0 or P at time T ,
as is implied in previous work in C&T as well as SREC markets (see [25], [35], [51], [14],
and [15]). This property is consistent with the comments made in Section 4.3 regarding the
form of the finite-player market clearing SREC price.
7. Conclusion. We introduce an N -player stochastic game for an SREC market with
heterogeneous sub-populations, where each player aims to navigate the market at minimum
cost by modulating their planned SREC generation and trading activities. By taking the
infinite-population limit of the model, we obtain a MFG for the market, which is a more
tractable problem. Using tools from variational analysis, we are able to express the optimal
controls of each agent as the solution to a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE, and thus we are able
to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the MFG. We also are able to numerically solve
the FBSDE, allowing us to run numerous experiments that allow us to better understand
the structure of the optimal controls of the agents, and the associated implications on the
SREC price and on non-compliance probabilities of each sub-population of agents.
In particular, we see that the optimal behaviours of agents expressed as a function of
their SREC inventory exist in regimes corresponding to the benefit a firm receives by ac-
quiring an additional SREC. This is reinforced when observing the functional forms that
the optimal controls take. Additionally, we observe that while the infinite-player SREC
price process is deterministic, in the N -player stochastic game with agents behaving as per
the MFG solution, this is not the case. Instead, we see notable price volatility, particularly
towards the end of the compliance period, as firms have less time to react to any unfore-
seen shocks that impact their compliance probability. We also discover a positive linear
relationship between total planned generation and total trading for each firm.
There are natural areas for improvement, and possible extensions to this work. Calibra-
tion to real-world data remains challenging due to a lack of transparency into the underlying
cost functions of regulated LSEs, but is nonetheless a critical next step. Similarly, extending
this work to a multi-period SREC market is another area that must be explored further.
Nonetheless, in providing the mathematical framework contained in this paper, we have
produced a logically consistent and coherent structure under which SREC markets (and
indeed, any emissions market) can be studied holistically. We feel such a framework is
potentially of great use to regulatory bodies and regulated firms in these systems alike, and
aim to continue to refine the work in this area further.
36 A. SHRIVATS, D. FIROOZI, AND S. JAIMUNGAL
REFERENCES
[1] The Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market Annual report 2018.
[2] R. A¨ıd, M. Basei, and H. Pham, A McKean-Vlasov approach to distributed electricity generation
development, arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.01302v3, (2019).
[3] E. S. Amundsen, F. M. Baldursson, and J. B. Mortensen, Price volatility and banking in green
certificate markets, Environmental and Resource Economics, 35 (2006), pp. 259–287.
[4] A. Angiuli, C. V. Graves, H. Li, J.-F. Chassagneux, F. Delarue, and R. Carmona, Cemracs
2017: numerical probabilistic approach to MFG, ESAIM: Proceedings and Surveys, 65 (2019),
pp. 84–113.
[5] M. Aziz and P. E. Caines, A mean field game computational methodology for decentralized cellular
network optimization, IEEE transactions on control systems technology, 25 (2016), pp. 563–576.
[6] A. Bensoussan, M. H. M. Chau, and S. C. P. Yam, Mean field stackelberg games: Aggregation of
delayed instructions, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 53 (2015), pp. 2237–2266.
[7] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, and P. Yam, Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control Theory,
Springer-Verlag New York, 2013.
[8] P. Cardaliaguet, M. Cirant, and A. Porretta, Remarks on nash equilibria in mean field game
models with a major player, arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.02811, (2018).
[9] P. Cardaliaguet, F. Delarue, J.-M. Lasry, and P.-L. Lions, The Master Equation and the
Convergence Problem in Mean Field Games: (AMS-201), vol. 2, Princeton University Press, 2019.
[10] P. Cardaliaguet and C.-A. Lehalle, Mean field game of controls and an application to trade
crowding, Mathematics and Financial Economics, 12 (2018), pp. 335–363.
[11] R. Carmona, M. Coulon, and D. Schwarz, The valuation of clean spread options: linking electric-
ity, emissions and fuels, Quantitative Finance, 12 (2012), p. 19511965, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14697688.2012.750733.
[12] R. Carmona and F. Delarue, Probabilistic analysis of mean-field games, SIAM Journal on Control
and Optimization, 51 (2013), pp. 2705–2734.
[13] R. Carmona, F. Delarue, et al., Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I-II,
Springer, 2018.
[14] R. Carmona, M. Fehr, and J. Hinz, Optimal stochastic control and carbon price formation, SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, 48 (2009), p. 21682190, https://doi.org/10.1137/080736910.
[15] R. Carmona, M. Fehr, J. Hinz, and A. Porchet, Market design for emission trading schemes,
Siam Review, 52 (2010), pp. 403–452.
[16] R. Carmona, J.-P. Fouque, Mousavi, and L.-H. Sun, Mean field games and systemic risk, Com-
munications in Mathematical Sciences, 13 (2015), pp. 911–933.
[17] R. Carmona, J.-P. Fouque, S. M. Mousavi, and L.-H. Sun, Systemic risk and stochastic games
with delay, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 179 (2018), pp. 366–399.
[18] R. Carmona and D. Lacker, A probabilistic weak formulation of mean field games and applications,
The Annals of Applied Probability, 25 (2015), pp. 1189–1231.
[19] R. Carmona and X. Zhu, A probabilistic approach to mean field games with major and minor players,
The Annals of Applied Probability, 26 (2016), pp. 1535–1580.
[20] P. Casgrain and S. Jaimungal, Algorithmic trading in competitive markets with mean field games,
SIAM Newsletter, 2019, (2019).
[21] P. Casgrain and S. Jaimungal, Mean-field games with differing beliefs for algorithmic trading, (To
appear) Mathematical Finance, (2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.06101.
[22] P. Chan and R. Sircar, Fracking, renewables, and mean field games, SIAM Review, 59 (2017),
pp. 588–615.
[23] J.-F. Chassagneux, D. Crisan, and F. Delarue, A probabilistic approach to classical solutions of
the master equation for large population equilibria, arXiv preprint arXiv:1411.3009, (2014).
[24] J.-F. Chassagneux, D. Crisan, F. Delarue, et al., Numerical method for fbsdes of McKean–
Vlasov type, The Annals of Applied Probability, 29 (2019), pp. 1640–1684.
[25] M. Coulon, J. Khazaei, and W. B. Powell, SMART-SREC: A stochastic model of the New Jersey
solar renewable energy certificate market, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
73 (2015), p. 1331, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2015.05.004.
[26] B. Djehiche, A. Tcheukam, and H. Tembine, Mean-field-type games in engineering, arXiv preprint
MFG IN SREC MARKETS 37
arXiv:1605.03281, (2017).
[27] I. Ekeland and R. Temam, Convex analysis and variational problems, vol. 28, Siam, 1999.
[28] D. Firoozi, Mean field games and optimal execution problems: hybrid and partially observed major mi-
nor systems, PhD Thesis, McGill University, 2019, https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/concern/theses/
nc580p83x?locale=en.
[29] D. Firoozi and P. E. Caines, The execution problem in finance with major and minor traders: A
mean field game formulation, in Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG):
Advances in Dynamic and Mean Field Games, vol. 15, Birkha¨user Basel, 2017, pp. 107–130.
[30] D. Firoozi, A. Pakniyat, and P. E. Caines, A mean field game - hybrid systems approach to optimal
execution problems in finance with stopping times, in Proceedings of the 56th IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC), Melbourne, Australia, Dec. 2017, pp. 3144–3151.
[31] G. Fu, P. Graewe, U. Horst, and A. Popier, A mean field game of optimal portfolio liquidation,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.04911, (2018).
[32] D. Gomes, L. Lafleche, and L. Nurbekyan, A mean-field game economic growth model, in 2016
American Control Conference (ACC), 2016, pp. 4693–4698.
[33] D. Gomes, R. M. Velho, and M.-T. Wolfram, Socio-economic applications of finite state mean field
games, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering
Sciences, 372 (2014), pp. 1–17.
[34] P. J. Graber and C. Mouzouni, On mean field games models for exhaustible commodities trade, (To
appear) ESAIM: COCV.
[35] S. Hitzemann and M. Uhrig-Homburg, Equilibrium price dynamics of emission permits, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53 (2018), pp. 1653–1678.
[36] S. Howison and D. Schwarz, Risk-neutral pricing of financial instruments in emission markets: A
structural approach, SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics, 3 (2012), p. 709739, https://doi.
org/10.1137/100815219.
[37] M. Huang, Large-population lqg games involving a major player: the Nash certainty equivalence prin-
ciple, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 48 (2010), pp. 3318–3353.
[38] M. Huang, P. E. Caines, and R. P. Malhame´, An invariance principle in large population stochastic
dynamic games, Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 20 (2007), pp. 162–172.
[39] M. Huang, P. E. Caines, and R. P. Malhame´, Large-population cost-coupled lqg problems with
nonuniform agents: individual-mass behavior and decentralized -Nash equilibria, IEEE transac-
tions on automatic control, 52 (2007), pp. 1560–1571.
[40] M. Huang, R. P. Malhame´, P. E. Caines, et al., Large population stochastic dynamic games:
closed-loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle, Communications
in Information & Systems, 6 (2006), pp. 221–252.
[41] X. Huang, S. Jaimungal, and M. Nourian, Mean-field game strategies for optimal execution, Ap-
plied Mathematical Finance, 26 (2019), pp. 153–185.
[42] M. Hustveit, J. S. Frogner, and S.-E. Fleten, Tradable green certificates for renewable support:
The role of expectations and uncertainty, Energy, 141 (2017), pp. 1717–1727.
[43] J. Khazaei, M. Coulon, and W. B. Powell, Adapt: A price-stabilizing compliance policy for
renewable energy certificates: The case of srec markets, Operations Research, 65 (2017), pp. 1429–
1445.
[44] A. C. Kizilkale, R. Salhab, and R. P. Malhame´, An integral control formulation of mean field
game based large scale coordination of loads in smart grids.
[45] J. M. Lasry and P. L. Lions, Jeux a` champ moyen. i - le cas stationnaire, Comptes Rendus de
l’Acade´mie des Sciences, 343 (2006), pp. 619–625.
[46] J. M. Lasry and P. L. Lions, Jeux a` champ moyen. ii - horizon fini et controˆle optimal, Comptes
Rendus de l’Acade´mie des Sciences, 343 (2006), pp. 679–684.
[47] J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions, Mean field games, Japanese journal of mathematics, 2 (2007), pp. 229–
260.
[48] C.-A. Lehalle and C. Mouzouni, A mean field game of portfolio trading and its consequences on
perceived correlations, arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.09606, (2019).
[49] M. Nourian and P. E. Caines, -Nash mean field game theory for nonlinear stochastic dynamical
systems with major and minor agents, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 51 (2013),
pp. 3302–3331.
38 A. SHRIVATS, D. FIROOZI, AND S. JAIMUNGAL
[50] H. Pham, Continuous-time stochastic control and optimization with financial applications, vol. 61,
Springer Science & Business Media, 2009.
[51] J. Seifert, M. Uhrig-Homburg, and M. Wagner, Dynamic behavior of CO2 spot prices, Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 56 (2008), p. 180194, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jeem.2008.03.003.
[52] A. Shrivats and S. Jaimungal, Behaving optimally in solar renewable energy certificate markets,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.06337, (2019).
[53] SRECTrade, New jersey srec market, 2019, https://www.srectrade.com/srec markets/new jersey (ac-
cessed 2019-02-13).
[54] S. J. Xuancheng Huang, Robust stochastic games and systemic risk, SSRN, (2017), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3024021.
MFG IN SREC MARKETS 39
Appendix A. Numerical solution algorithm for McKean-Vlasov FBSDE.
In this appendix, we detail the steps of our numerical algorithm to solve (4.33). We first
comment on the general structure of our solution to provide an intuition for the methodology
used, and then describe the algorithm in great detail.
Recall that we aim to find a mean field distribution µ and a progressively measurable
triple (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t) that solves (4.33) such that the optimal controls given the choice of µ
imply a controlled state process Xit over i with the distribution µ. Mathematically, this
means our solution should have µ
(k)
t coinciding with L(Xit) for all i ∈ K, for all k ∈ K. The
bmµ that does so is a fixed point. At the fixed point, we replace µ
(k)
t with L(Xit), and turn
(4.33) into a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE.
Our implementation to solve this fixed point problem is a simple iterative scheme. We
begin with an initial guess for µ (denoted by µ(0)) and solve (4.33). From this, we fully
characterize the firm’s optimal controls through (4.24) and (4.25) as well as the price process
Sµt . These quantities imply a distribution of X
i
t when all firms are behaving according to
their mean field strategy, which we denote as µ(1). If µ(0) and µ(1) are sufficiently close,
then we have obtained the solution we seek. If not, we repeat the process, solving the
FBSDE given µ(1). This process continues until we have convergence between the mean
field distributions, at which point we output the results.
This process is summarized in Figure 9.
Initialize mean
field distributions
µ(q) := {(µ(q),kt )t∈T}k∈K
Solve (4.33) given
µ(q), for all k ∈ K.
Output Sµt , X
i
t , Y
i
t , g
i,?
t ,Γ
i,?
t
Set µ
(q+1),k
t = L(Xit) for all k ∈ K
Set µ(q+1) = {(µ(q,kt )t∈T}k∈K
Output
controls,
mean field
distribution,
and price path
if µ(q+1), µ(q) close
if µ(q+1), µ(q) not close
set q = q + 1
Figure 9: Numerical Scheme Diagram
We expand upon this basic explanation below.
1. Initialization and Setup
A. Set q = 0. Define  > 0 as a tolerance limit.
B. Choose a grid of X (denoted by X := {x1, x2, ..., xd}), and a grid of time-
steps T′ := {0 = t1, t2, ..., tm = T}, where tj = j∆t.
C. For all k ∈ K, choose an initial distribution for the state of agents at t = 0
(denoted by ξk).
Note:The algorithm proceeds in parallel for all sub-populations, so we omit
‘for all k ∈ K’ henceforth.
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D. Initialize µ. We assume that all agents generate at their baseline hkt and do
not take part in the SREC market (trading is 0). This assumption, along
with the initial distribution of SRECs implied by ξk, implies a distribution
of SRECs across agents at each time-step (for each sub-population) through
(2.3) which is denoted by µ(0).
E. Initialize Ytj for all tj ∈ T′ and all x ∈ X under the assumption that all agents
generate at their baseline hkt and do not take part in the SREC market.
2. Iteratively update
A. Let q = q + 1
B. Update Yt:
For tj ∈ T′, from T to 0:
• Compute the mean and variance of Xtj+1 |Xtj = x through (4.33a)
using the previous update of Yt, µ
(q−1).
• For all xu ∈ X, assume that Ytj+1 = Y (k)(tj+1, xu;µ(q−1)) is locally
linear in xu. Use this (in conjunction with (4.33c) and (2.3)) to
analytically calculate Y ktj for each point x ∈ X.
C. Update the mean field distribution to find µ(q):
For tj ∈ T′, from 0 to T : For k ∈ K
• Use the updated Ytj along with (4.33a) to characterize the mean and
variance µ
(q),k
tj
Denote µ(q) = {(µ(q),ktj )t∈T′}k∈K
D. Calculate D := d(µ(q),µ(q−1)) for some notion of distance between mea-
sures, d.
If D > , return to Item 2.
Else, proceed to Item 3.
3. Output
Use the calculated values to compute (4.17a), (4.17b), (4.29).
